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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OFTHESTATEOFUTAH
C.R. OWENS TRUCKING
CORPORATION
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
12988

HAROLD STEWART
Defendant and Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff for damages
sustained to its truck which resulted when the truck hit
a cow owned by the defendant on Highway 91 in Millard
County, Utah.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff moved for a change of venue (R. 17), which
motion was denied. A jury trial was then held wherein
the jury found for the defendant and against the
plaintiff, no cause of action. Plaintiff then moved for
judgment not withstanding verdict or for a new trial (R.
75 ), which motion was also denied.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the verdict of the jury set aside
based upon the prejudicial statement of defendant's
counsel regarding the non-existence of insurance, and
that seven of the eight jurors were personally
acquainted with the defendant and were engaged in the
same vocational endeavors as the defendant. The
plaintiff would further ask that a change of venue be
granted to a district court where impartial jurors could
be obtained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arose as a result of an accident which oc·
curred at approximately 10 p.m. on the 22 day of July,
1971, on U.S. Highway 91 approximately four tenths of a
mile south of Meadow, Utah. A cow owned by the
defendant darted in front of a semi truck owned by the
plaintiff and driven by its agent. As a result of the
collison the wheels of the truck locked and the truck
went into a concrete ditch resulting in the damage
which plaintiff alleges was as follows: $8, 421. 76 for
repairing the truck, $1,423.67 for repairing the flat bed,
$377.00 for towing expense, and $5,000 for loss of use
while the turck was being repaired.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in the
maintenance of his fence thus allowing the cow on the
highway which resulted in the accident.
At the time of the trial, of the selected jurors, seven
of the eight were personally acquainted with the
defendant and seven of the eight were engaged , either
directly or through their husbands, in raising livestock.
(Tr. 2 thru 29) A challenge for cause was made against
each ofthe jurors who fit into both of the categories, but
such challenge was overruled by the court. (Tr. 29 and
30).
During the course of the trial, defendant's attorney
made the statement which was recalled by plaintiff's
at_torney as being "I want the jury to know that my
chent does not have insurance, he is on his own," (R.
75), but which the transcript indicates was "There is no
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insurance involved in this case, your Honor, may we
make that clear" (Tr. 31). However, the defendant had
in force an insurance policy providing liability coverage
in an amount in excess of the prayer of plaintiff's
complaint and any taxable costs (R. 82).
ARGUMENT
POI NT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A
MISTRIAL OR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON THE
PREJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF DEFENDANTS
COUNSEL REGARDING INSURANCE
A. ADMISSABILITY OF EVIDENCE REGARDING
DEFENDANT'S INSURANCE.

The general rule, everywhere adherred to, is that in a
personal injury action, evidence that the defendant
carries insurance protecting him from liability to third
persons on account of his negligence is inadmissable
Balle vs. Smith 81 U 179 17 P2d 224 (1932). The

Rationale for this position is stated by Justice Polland in
his opinion in Balle (cited supra) at page 229.
"It <the fact of insurance) is irrelevant to the issue of
negligence ... <and) is wholly inadmissable ...

The Justice goes on to state that courts jealousy gained
against the (interjection) of insurance issues not only
because of irrelevance but also because of the highly
prejudicial nature of that evidence. He states that it is
widely believed that once jurors know a defendant is
insured, they will be less likely to decide the case on the
merits and will return larger verdicts than they
otherwise might have done. Reason follows that if
knowledge of insurance would have this result, a
knowledge of the absence of insurance which resulted
in this case would prejudice a jury against the plaintiff
and in favor of the defendant.
Utah cases on the question of insurance admissability
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have usually arisen from the factual circumstances
wherein the defendant objected to the entry into the
case of fact of his liability coverage. There has been no
case presenting the exact factual question
herein
presented, which is:
Can the defendant through evidence or argument by
counsel bring before the jury the fact that he is not insured. The answer here must also be no. The Rational
behind the non-admittance of insurance remains unchanged. If it's existence is deemed prejudicial to one
side, then, its nonexistence would be equally prejudicial
to the other. In the Utah case of Hill vs. Cloward, 14
U2d55, 377 P2d 186 (1962), Chief Justice Crockett in
addressing himself to the plaintiff's right to have the
insurance issue excluded from the jury stated,
" .. .inasmuch as the defendant is entitled to have this
extra4eous matter excluded from the case, the plaintiff is
entitled to the same protection if he so desires."

Other jurisdictions in which this question has arisen
have uniformly held that the defendant cannot interject
into the trial the fact that he is not, or is only partially,
insured. See Anno 4ALR2d 761 Sec. 4 at 773. And this is
true even when plaintiff has raised the question of insurance through voir dire examination of the jury. (See
Anno 4ALR2d, cited supra) Utah policy, as stated in
Balle and Hill, wherein the insurance issue should not
be brought by either party before the trier of fact is in
accord with the view of these jurisdictions. Thus, in
Utah, it is unquestionably settled law that any fact
tending to show that defendant either does or does not
carry liability insurance is inadmissable as evidence.
The issue of insurance can be brought up before the
trial of fact without constituting prejudicial error and
thus grounds for reversal. The voir dire examination of
the jury is one such permissible time. The Utah rule.
would be that at least the inference of insurance could
be raised during the voir dire while empaneling a jury if
counsel is acting in good faith and for the purpose of
ascertaining the qualifications of jurors, and not merely
for the purpose of informing them that defendant is
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insured. See Balle at 229. But, this right to question
jurors as to any pecunlary interest they might have in
an insurance company is strictly limited. Defendants
right to have fact of insurance suppressed is directly in
balance. Counsel who treads beyond the thin line
allowable runs the risk of having a mistrial declared
due to his raising of the insurance issue. See Morrison
v. Perry 104 U151140P2d 772 (1943) at 778, wherein the
court held that conduct of plaintiff's counsel in
questioning prospective jurors so as to indicate that the
insurance company was the real party in interest
constituted misconduct and was reversible error. Here,
the court stated that the permissible method for voir
dire of prospective jurors was set forth in Balle v.
Smith.That by questioning jurors as to their financial
interests in specifically named insurance institutions
went too far, towards suggesting the presence of insurance, and thus constituted reversible error, notwithstanding the lack of any showing of specific
prejudice created by the question.
Another Utah case permitting the fact of defendants
insurance to be brought before the jury is Reid v.
Owens 98 P50, 93 P2d 680 0939). This, however, involves
a narrowly limited exception to the general rule
where the defendants statement that he is insured is so
connected with his admission on the question of
liability, that the entire admission is allowed into
evidence. This exception is not presented by our facts.
We would submit that it is the rule in Utah that except
for the narrowly drawn exceptions above mentioned,
<interjection) of the insurance issue within hearing of
the trier of fact constitutes misconduct of counsel and
reversible error.
·
B.

REVERSIBLE ERROR CREATED BY
MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL WHO BRINGS THE
ISSUE OF INSURANCE BEFORE THE TRIER OF
FACT.

In Balle where the issue of insurance had arisen on
Plaintiff's counsels voir dire examination of the jury
and through a later statement by counsel, the court set
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forth guidelines as to whether the statements constituted reversible error. Whether counsel abused his
privilege by forcing the fact of insura nee to the attention of the jury is a test (Balle at 229). Where the
remark by counsel concerning insurance was improper,
grounds exist for reversible error due to the misconduct
of counsel. Balle cites 56 ALR 1486 as authority for the
proposition that such a remark is misconduct and would
be grounds for reversible error if the jury was influenced by the statement. 4 ALR2 761 cites cases which
demand an automatic reversal in such instances due to
the extremely prejudicial nature of the insurance
question.
Other factors in Balle which could be used by a court
in determining the prejudicial nature of counsel's
misconduct are:
1. Whether the remark was made in good faith, or was

made wilfully and calculated to prejudice the jury.
2. Whether the verdict or the amount of the judgment
were altered greatly by the prejudicial statement.
Plainly, it is no better for the defendant whether the
jury learns he is insured by accident or wilfully. The
rule is obviously designed to deter counsel's willful
statements.
No more willful statement could be presented than by
our facts. Clearly the statement was intended to be
heard by the jury and it was calculated to influence
them. It would be difficult to determine the effect of a
prejudicial statement concerning insurance on any
given jury. Courts which employ the change of outcome criteria do so by comparing the outcome of the
case with the insurance issue to a similar case where
the insurance issue was properly suppressed. If the
verdict is substantially different than the normal result,
this would be one factor in determining whether the
remark prejudicially influenced the jury. However, this
test has only been employed in those cases that
defendant has lost and appealed assigning as error the
~act that plaintiff had brought in the question of his
msurance. See Balle at 231 where the court held the
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remark was not reversible error citing for one reason
the verdict not being overly excessive.
We submit that when the jury is directly informed
that defendant is not insured that the only cause for the
prejudice created other than a new trial, would be to
allow plaintiff to prove that defendant was indeed insured. In our case, the fact that plaintiff recovered
nothing is one cirteria which the court should look to in
assessing prejudice created by the remark.
In Mornson vs. Perry supra, the court reversed and
remanded the case to the district court for a new trialln
reversing, the court held that it was misconduct and
reversible error for plaintiff's counsel to attempt to
interject the fact of insurance at the trial by asking
jurors on voir dire whether they were stockholders in or
knew the agents of a particular insurance company. In
ruling, the court cited Justice McDonough in Reid vs.
Olson (supra).
"If questions are propounded ... for the obvious purpose of
revealing such irrelevant fact <insurance) a mistrial may be
properly declared or a new trial granted".

In our case, this court should not let counsel accomplish by direct statement what it has not let others
accomplish by guise and subterfuge.
In Hill vs. Cloward (supra) the court in holding that
plaintiff had the right to keep the insurance (or lack of
it) issue from the jury, refused to grant a new trial
because plaintiff had waived his right thereto by
failure to enter a timely objection to the admission of
the insurance statement. However, Hill is in accord
with the other Utah cases in applying the rational found
in Balk excluding insurance issues. Hill states only that
one must properly preserve his right by objection if it is
to be raised on appeal.
Robinson vs. H Reinson 17U 2d 261, 409 P2d 121 (1965)

is in accord with the earlier Balle case in that both agree
that any mention whatsoever of insurance will not
compel a mistrial or a new trial. Instances where this
has occurred have been discussed above. But, Robinson
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does place much responsibility with the trial court for
determining whether the insurance issue has so
prejudiced a party that he cannot obtain a fair trial and
for making whatever corrective measures he deems
suitable. In effect, Robinson is against the proposition
that any mention of insurance constitutes reversible
error and leaves room for restoration of damage
through curative instructions and admonitions by the
trial judge. However, the rationale of Robinson is not
applicable wholly to our case. Robinson is based on the
promise that the mention of insurance is less prejudicial
to today's defendant because insurance is now so
common that today's juror assumes defendant carries
it. (Robinson at 123). The court goes on to state that the
question of insurance should still be left out of the trial,
and that it is the duty of court and counsel to keep it out,
but, presumbably, if the issue does get in, its not as
prejudicial as before. But, since today's juror assumes
defendant is insured, it is now even more prejudicial to
plaintiff to allow defendant to claim that he is not.
Robinson mentions other factors in consideration of
the prejudicial nature of the remark. These are essentially those discussed in Balle.
1. Whether the mention of insurance was intentional or
inadvertantly discussed and the court rightly decides that the
harm is substantially the same either way?
2. The test which is determinative is whether the " utterence was so harmful" so as to deprive a party of a fair
trial. This depends on whether a "Reasonable likelihood"
exists that in the "absence of the incident there would have
been a substantially different result."

We would respectfully submit to the court that in view
of plaintiff's substantial actual damages coupled with a
substantial issue of liability,that defendant's counsel's
utterance was so harmful that there is a reasonable
liklihood a substantially different result would have
been reached had that incident not occured. And,
practically, the only way to keep the insurance issue out
of these cases to deter those who would interject it.
The policy of the state of Utah is to exclude these issues
<All cases cited concur).Robinson inposes it as a duty of
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counsel to keep these elements from the trier. In our
case we have a deliberate statement by counsel
focusing attention squarely upon the prohibited insurance issue. We submit that the only way to cure a
naked statement by counsel as was made here, was to
allow proof of the existence of insurance, or to grant a
new trial. It has been to the present the law in Utah to
award a new trial to the party the victim of such a
statement as was herein made. In Young vs. Barney, 20
u 2dl08 433 P2d 846 (1967) Chief Justice Crockett
speaking for the court on the issue of keeping insurance
issues from the trier of fact stated:
"The safeguarding against disclosure to a jury of insurance coverage in personal injury trials is a very touchy
subject which lawyers and judges have always been obliged
to handle with such caution as to justify use of the metaphor
•walking on eggs. ' The understanding has always been that
it was prejudicial error to deliberately inject insurance into
such a trial"

For this proposition, Chief Justice Crockett cites
Balle as well as other cases discussed above including
Robinson. In view of the deliberate injection of the insurance issue through defendant's counsels statement,
we submit that prejudicial error occurred and a new
trial should be granted.
POINT II
BASED UPON THE NATURE OF THE CASE, THE
DEFENDANT INVOLVED, AND THE AVAILABLE
JURORS, THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF
VENUE.

Of further prejudice to plaintiff's rights was the trial
courts failure to grant plaintiff's m<_>tl()!lf()r a change of
venue. UCA 78-13-9 provides for a [c!iscretionary change
?f venue from a county having proper venue where there
is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had
due to local prejudice, bias, or the inability to locate
among the local populace a fair and impartial jury.
The - obvious purpose behind the Utah Statute and
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similar statutes in other jurisdictions is to promote the
ends of justice by getting rid of local prejudices which
may operate detrimentally to the rights of a party
(Litigant). Trial judges should in these questions follow
the admonition of Justice Larson in Anderson vs.
Johnson 1U2d400, 268 P2d 427 (1954), and give a liberal
construction to this statute so as to render possible the
attainment of its object. VCA 78-13-9 (2) is written
broadly enough so as to provide the trial court with a
vehicle to order a change of venue for any reason if it
appears a party might have problems obtaining a fair
trial by an impartial jury. Cases from other jurisdictions cited in the collateral references to this statute
have provided for a change of venue where a large
number of the inhabitants of a county have an interest
adverse to one of the parties Litigant(see 103 ALR 1025)
or when local prejudice directed towards an officer or
stockholder of a corporation may prevent the corporation from obtaining its right to a fair trial. See 63
ALR 1015. Trial courts should grant changes of venue
and thereby guarantee a party's right to a fair trial in
all cases where from the facts of the case it reasonably
appears local prejudice will prevent a party from
rightfully obtaining a fair and impartial adjudication of
case on its merits.
In this case, it appears on its face that a truck owner
from the northern part of the state attempting to
recover damages incurred in Millard County, would not
be able to receive a fair trial from an impartial jury in
that county, especially where that jury is largely
composed of fellow cattlemen and their wives.
Page 1-31 of the transcript of proceedings at the trial
contains the examination of prospective jurors both by
the trial judge and by plaintiff's attorney. Pursuant to
this examination, the record reveals that seventeen
prospective jurors were questioned. Of this number,
only three did not know the defendant. The other
fourteen knew defendant in various degrees, some
having known him since childhood, others being
relatives and others knowing him from business
associations including membership in the same cattle
grazing association. Three jurors were excused for
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cause including one relative, one fellow member of the
grazing association and one cattleman who had earlier
been involved in a similar suit and claimed that that
fact might influence his judgement in the present case
of the remaining fourteen jurors. All but two were
closely connected with the cattle business. Approximately one third raised cattle as their main
business. The others maintained various numbers of
livestock ranging from one hundred twenty five to ten.
Of the two people who ran no cattle, one raised quarterhorses for sale.
The prospective members of the jury were well aware
that this type of suit occurs in their area. Three of the
seventeen stated that they had themselves been involved in similar types of suits, though one only as a
juror. Another stated that although he ran a good
number of cattle, that he always maintained his fences
well and thus, had had no trouble with any law suits.
The courts have recognized that it is not the nature of
man to make a decision which might run contrary to his
own interests, be they pecuniary or otherwise. Case law
exists in matters where jurors are disqualified from
hearing a particular case or a particular type of case.
As in the change of venue situation, the fundamental
rule is that jurors must be thoroughly impartial as
between the parties. Any bias or prejudice with respect
to a case disqualifies one as a juror. Logan vs. U.S. 144
U.S. 263.

Speaking to the issue of Juror Bias, such bias can be
actually proven to exist, or implied, which is to say
presumed by law to exist. A large body of case law has
developed which states that if a certain relationship or
mutuality of interest is found to exist between a juror
and a party, the juror is presumed to be biased either
for or against the party and should be disqualified.
Bias of a juror, either express or implied, is grounds
in this state for a challenge for cause. UCA 47 F (6). In
Utah, bias has been defined to be a state of mind in
which a person will not act with total impartiality. Hopt
vs. Utah 120 U.S. 430.
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Courts also recognize bias growing out of social,
business or professional relationships. Persons who
through their affiliations or friendships, prejudices or
habits come to look more favorably upon one party in a
case or more favorably upon one side in a particular
class of cases are subject to disqualification. Further, it
is reported to be the growing trend to disqualify from
service the juror who has one of the above described
interests, even when such interest would not itself be
sufficient to challenge that juror for cause. 79 ALR 278.
Courts have recognized impliedly that bias may exist
when a stockholder sits on a jury in a suit wherein his
corporation is a party litigant. And this is true even
when his only interest is to hold stock in a corporation
which holds stock in the corporation which is a party to
the suit. 31 AM. Jur Juries 171.
One who has any interest in an insurance corr.pany
will be barred from serving as a juror in a case in which
the insurance company has an interest in the outcome .
Any interest has been held to mean an agent of the
company, a stockholder thereof, or a relative of a
stockholder. 31 AM. Jur. Juries 1972.
Although a split of authority exists as to whether this
relationship bars one from serving on the jury, the
courts do recognize that as a practical matter, bias may
exist where members of a jury are also members of a
municipality or other government body which is a party
to the suit. And this is true even when the only interest
would be the presumable loss to the taxpayer should the
suit end adversely to the government body. 31 AM. Jur.
Juries 176.

Social or economic adherences are also recognized as
a cause implying bias in an interested juror. Metallic
Gold Mineral Co. vs. Watson 117 P609 held that one
having a strong sympathy for laboring men was
disqualified from serving on a jury in a case where one
of the parties was a laborer.
In Utah, both parties have the right to have their case
decided by an impartial jury, free from bias and
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prejudice. Although specific examples of pecuniary
interest or other sufficient relationships between jurors
and parties are not spelled out by the code, it is
automatic that in Utah as in other jurisdictions, the
courts well recognize implied bias arising from an interest in the outcome of a case beyond that of a normal
juror. We submit that in this case a prospective juror
who is a personal friend and fell ow cattleman of the
defendant's and who well realizes that he may himself
soon be the defendant in a similar action, has such an
interest in the case, pecuniary and otherwise, that he
cannot meet this states definition of an impartial juror.
Indeed, one prospective juror stated that such fact
would tend to influence him to favor the cattleman.
However, he later retreated somewhat from this
position and plaintiff's counsel's motion to a challenge
for cause was denied. (tr. 19,28)
This is the type of case contemplated by UCA 78-13-9
with its provisions for granting a change of venue in the
interests of justice when local prejudice or feeling may
prevent a fair trial.
The trial judge asked each prospective juror who
owned cattle whether or not he also drove a car, apparently in the belief that the interests would balance
each other. We believe that it is a mistake to think that
the jurors interests do balance. When one drives as an
incidental, but maintains cattle as a livelihood, we
submit that the interest in the preservation of the
livelihood would be far greater.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that there are various factors which
should be considered accumulatively, such factors being
natural sympathy of the community for a local industry, the personal interest that nearly all members of
the jury had in the cattle business, the fact that this type
of litigation appeared to be fairly prevalent and known
well among members of the jury, the fact ·that the
defendant was generally well known in the community
and was numbered among the friends of various
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members of the jury, and the fact that defendants
counsel's statement of the non-existence of insurance
was particularly prejudicial in light of the above factors
causing jurors to believe that their friend and fellow
cattleman would be bearing payment of the suit himseH.
In view of all the circumstances, plaintiff submits that
prejudicial error has been committed, that a fair impartial trial was not obtained and the case should be
remanded to a different district court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Carl T. Smith
Stephen W. Farr
Smith and Farr
520 26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

